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A job ladder model with stochastic employment opportunities
Jake Bradley
School of Economics, University of Nottingham and IZA
Axel Gottfries
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We set up a model with on-the-job search in which firms infrequently post vacan-
cies for which workers occasionally apply. The model nests the standard job lad-
der and stock-flow models as special cases, while remaining analytically tractable
and easy to estimate from standard panel data sets. The parameters from a struc-
turally estimated model on US data are significantly different from either the re-
strictions imposed by a stock-flow or job ladder model. Imposing these restric-
tions significantly understates the search option associated with employment and
are, unlike our model, inconsistent with recent survey evidence and declining job
finding rates and starting wage with duration of unemployment, both of which are
present in the data.
Keywords. On-the-job search, wage dispersion, wage posting, stock-flow.
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1. Introduction
Due to their effectiveness in replicating unemployment, worker turnover, and wage dy-
namics, on-the-job search models are extensively used to evaluate labor market poli-
cies.1 Embedded in the standard job ladder model is a single friction, modeled as a Pois-
son process, that prevents the reallocation of workers into more productive jobs. In this
paper, we extend the standard job ladder model by adding an additional state variable
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on workers, their employment opportunities.2 These suitable vacancies are posted in-
frequently by firms and applications to these are made intermittently by workers. As
special cases, our model nests the standard job ladder model and a version of the stock-
flow model. After estimating the model, we find that the restrictions implied by both
the standard job ladder model and the stock flow model leads to a significant under-
estimate of the search option associated with employment. Furthermore, the model is
consistent with survey evidence on work search behavior and generates a declining job
finding rate with the duration of unemployment and substantial wage losses following
displacement, which increase in the duration of unemployment, all of which the stan-
dard job ladder model fails to generate.
In the model, only some job openings are suitable for a given worker.3 This set of
job opportunities is treated as a latent variable that follows a stochastic process. Similar
to McCall (1970), firms create suitable job openings at some Poisson rate and at some
Poisson rate, a firm will stop looking for workers. In addition, as in Stigler (1962), workers
infrequently send out multiple applications. The worker subsequently accepts the best
offer, if it is better than her current job. We allow for different rates by employment status
to capture any differential search behavior. To match the data, we allow firms to differ
in productivity and workers have an individual skill component. We close the model by
assuming that firms post wage schedules in worker productivity, prior to meeting the
worker.4 In deciding on the optimal wage, a firm trades off the higher chance of hiring a
worker and the longer expected duration of the match against the higher wage cost. The
resulting model nests the workhorse empirical labor models of Burdett and Mortensen
(1998), and models of stock-flow matching, pioneered by Coles and Smith (1998), as
special cases. Like Burdett and Mortensen (1998), the model has an analytical closed-
form solution and is well identified and empirically tractable, allowing us to estimate all
of the parameters using a panel data set on wage and employment dynamics.
We estimate the model using a two-step procedure assuming that the labor market is
segmented by the workers’ level of education. In the first step, the parameters governing
workers’ search behavior are identified by the flows between labor markets states and
the duration dependence of the transition rate from unemployment to employment.
These moments are calculated from the Current Population Survey (CPS). In the second
step, the parameters governing worker and firm productivity distributions are identified
2A suitable vacancy or a labor market opportunity, in the context of our model, is defined as at the point
of application, a job that a worker is: (i) aware of; and (ii) suitable for. To describe these suitable vacancies
from a worker’s perspective, we will use the terms opportunities and prospects interchangeably.
3There is a number of papers emphasizing differences, (e.g., skill, location) between available vacan-
cies and the unemployed, creating thin markets, and thereby resulting in the simultaneous coexistence of
unemployed workers and vacancies; see, for example, Lucas and Prescott (1974), Coles and Smith (1998),
Shimer (2007), Alvarez and Shimer (2011), and Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers (2013). In our model, the stock
of job opportunities can be interpreted as the local conditions for the worker and a number of the un-
employed have no prospects and are therefore “mismatch” unemployed. Furthermore, the mismatch and
stock-flow family of models generate similar employment dynamics as our model and are also able to gen-
erate the declining job finding rate with the duration of unemployment.
4The main results of the paper are unchanged if the worker and the firm instead bargain over the wage
after the match has been formed. The implications of alternative assumptions on the nature of wage setting
are discussed in Section 2.7.
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from the distribution of average wages across workers as well as the overall distribution
of wages. Wage moments are computed using the Survey of Income and Program Partic-
ipation (SIPP). The estimated model matches the transition rates from employment to
unemployment and out of the labor force and the declining job finding rate with the du-
ration of unemployment. In the context of the model, the decline of the job finding rate
with the duration of unemployment is informative of the importance of worker’s em-
ployment prospects. The job finding rate declines with the duration of unemployment
because the newly unemployed have, on average, more prospects than the long-term
unemployed. In the job ladder model, all unemployed are the same, that is, unemploy-
ment is a single state, which implies that the model is unable to match the falling job
finding rate with the duration of unemployment.5
The estimated parameters imply that unemployed workers become aware of fewer
suitable vacancies compared to the employed. Unemployed workers send out applica-
tions more often: twice a month compared to less than twice a year for their employed
counterparts. This is consistent with Faberman, Mueller, Şahin, and Topa (2016) who
document that the unemployed send out a much larger number of applications but
the number of contacts are similar. The relation between the empirical observation of
Faberman et al. (2016) and our estimated search process is explored in Section 3.7. In
our model, unemployment is both due to the infrequent applications made by workers
as well as the workers lack of suitable opportunities. If all workers were to have some
prospects, that is, the limit as their arrival rate goes to infinity, the unemployment rate
would fall by a bit more than a half. In contrast, in the benchmark model of Burdett and
Mortensen (1998), unemployment disappears as the arrival rate of job contacts increase.
The relative importance of frequency of applications versus availability of prospects dif-
fers starkly by employment state suggesting that the one friction representation of the
labor market might be particularly poor.
Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2011) suggested that a particularly suitable metric
for assessing the option value of search is the ratio of the mean to the minimum wage,
hereafter the mean-min ratio (Mm). In order to generate a Mm ratio of close to two, our
estimation of the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model requires a large negative flow
benefit associated with unemployment whereas our estimated baseline model matches
the same frictional wage distribution with replacement ratios in the order of 25–50%.
This difference can be decomposed into two channels. First, employed workers receive
more job offers when they apply which shows up as if they were to sample wages from a
distribution that stochastically dominates that of their unemployed counterparts (con-
sistent with recent evidence from Faberman et al. (2016)). Second, consistent with the
data, after losing their job, a worker recently made unemployed will, on average, find
a job more quickly than the long-term unemployed. Interpreting the data through the
lens of the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model thus overestimates the foregone search
5Belot, Kircher, and Muller (2019) ran an experiment whereby job seekers are exposed to a greater num-
ber of vacancies. The treated had an increased number of interviews and particularly so for the long-term
unemployed. This result is broadly consistent with our estimated model, which suggests that an impor-
tant driver of unemployment is a lack of labor market opportunities rather than the frequency at which
unemployed workers apply.
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option, and hence underestimates the flow benefit associated with unemployment. This
estimated replacement ratio is consequential for the ability of models to generate cycli-
cal fluctuations in the unemployment rate.6
In a search model without OJS or stochastic match quality, there is no wage loss fol-
lowing displacement as the average outstanding wage is equal to the average starting
wage. In a job ladder model, on the other hand, workers gradually select into better pay-
ing jobs. The average employed worker will thus receive a higher wage than the average
worker coming from unemployment. Thus, a displaced worker will, on average, experi-
ence a wage loss, but these losses do not increase with the duration of unemployment.
General human capital depreciation in unemployment generates wages falling with the
duration of unemployment and thereby persistent losses. Researchers studying earnings
losses using job ladder models have often incorporated falling general human capital in
unemployment as an important ingredient.7
However, falling general human capital would entail falling reservation wages with
the duration of unemployment which is inconsistent with recent evidence from Krueger
and Mueller (2016). In addition, since all unemployed search in the same market, the
standard assumption of log linear production (and benefits) generates a constant job
finding rate with the duration of unemployment. If instead the matching set were to
decrease, the continuously falling human capital would imply the same for the job find-
ing rate, which is inconsistent with the empirical observation that the job finding rate
falls quickly in the first 3 months but is broadly constant thereafter. Our model, in ad-
dition to featuring a positive selection into better jobs, also features an additional state
variable—employment prospects. When the model is estimated, we find that the newly
unemployed do, on average, have more prospects than the long-term unemployed. This
implies that the job finding rate and starting wages fall with the duration of unemploy-
ment as, via dynamic selection, workers with more prospects exit and those without
prospects remain. Our model thus jointly fits: a falling job finding rate with the duration
of unemployment and a large wage loss following displacement that is increasing in the
duration of unemployment.
Similar to our paper, there is a number of search papers with multiple meetings and
applications. However, the key friction in these models differs from our own. A large
number of papers have modeled a thick market where workers make multiple applica-
tions and are able to direct their search (Albrecht, Gautier, and Vroman (2006), Kircher
6Shimer (2005) illustrated how the Diamond–Mortensen–Pissarides model with replacement ratios in
line with unemployment insurance generosity does not generate the empirically observed variations seen
in market tightness (level of vacancies divided by unemployment) given the low variation in labor produc-
tivity over the business cycle. If the flow benefit of unemployment is high, then the profit will be low and
the model is able to generate a sufficient amplification to productivity shocks (Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2008)). Elsby and Michaels (2013) considered a model in which firms exhibit decreasing returns to scale
allowing replacement rates to be low compared to average productivity but still high in comparison to the
marginal productivity. In our paper, we find that the flow value of unemployment is indeed high compared
to the average wage in line with Shimer (2005) and Elsby and Michaels (2013).
7See, for example, Krolikowski (2017), Jarosch (2015), and Burdett, Carrillo-Tudela, and Coles (2020) for
recent papers studying earnings losses.
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and Galenianos (2009), Kircher (2009), Wolthoff (2017)).8 Closer to our paper are recent
papers where workers are unable to direct their search but meet multiple firms (Elliott
(2014), Wolthoff (2014), Gautier and Holzner (2017)). In all of these models, either the
number of applications a worker can make is exogenous, or each application carries
an additional cost. Workers are ex ante homogeneous in their market conditions and
ex post heterogeneous in their position in a network. Our model takes a complemen-
tary approach where instead workers are ex ante heterogeneous in the thickness of their
individual markets, and the number of potential opportunities follows a stochastic pro-
cess.
Following Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2011), a number of recent papers have
examined the ability of search models to generate sufficient frictional wage dispersion.
Either there has to be an additional effect that offsets the foregone search option, or it
must be that the search option is not measured correctly. For example, if human capital
depreciates quickly in unemployment, then that can motivate workers to take low paid
jobs (Ortego-Marti (2016)). Such an explanation would entail reservation wages falling
quickly with the duration of unemployment which contradicts recent survey evidence
(Krueger and Mueller (2016)). Within a sequential auctions framework, like in Postel-
Vinay and Robin (2002) and Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006), the bargaining po-
sition of the worker increases when the worker takes a new job. These models can then
generate more wage dispersion via this foot in the door effect (Papp (2013)). A foot in
the door effect is also present in Carrillo-Tudela (2009) where there is no search option
in unemployment. Faberman et al. (2016) is the closest to this paper. They consider a
job ladder model with exogenously different wage offer distributions for employed and
unemployed workers. When a worker is employed, the lower arrival rate of job offers is
partly offset by a better offer distribution. In our model, the offer distribution is a time
varying object but, on average, the distribution faced by the employed stochastically
dominates the distribution facing the unemployed. Our paper can thus be seen as a mi-
crofoundation for the two exogenous offer distributions in Faberman et al. (2016).
Outline. The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we set up the
model and provide the analytical solution. In Section 3, we present the estimation of the
model and the quantitative results. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2. Model
2.1 The environment
Time is continuous and the labor market is populated by risk-neutral workers and firms.
Workers leave the labor force at a Poisson rate μ and are replaced by a doppelgänger
in unemployment.9 Workers are ex ante heterogeneous in their productivity x, dis-
tributed with the cumulative distribution Γx(·) and ex post vary in their employment
state s ∈ {ue}, their employment opportunities j, and if employed, their wage w. Firms
8In these models, the worker faces two problems: a portfolio problem in deciding which jobs to apply
for; as well as the optimum number of applications to send out.
9In this setting, the parameter μ acts in an isomorphic manner to a discount factor.
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are infinitely lived and are heterogeneous in their productivity y. The cumulative distri-
bution of productivity amongst vacancies is given by Γy(·). Both worker and firm pro-
ductivity distributions are primitives of the model. We will use F to refer to a firm’s rank
in the productivity distribution. The total output of a match is the product of worker and
firm types, xy(F). In unemployment, workers earn a flow income proportional to their
productivity type, bx. Jobs become unprofitable at an exogenous rate δ, which results in
the worker entering the pool of unemployed. Finally, we do not allow workers to quit,
other than to move to a new job.10
The frictions. A worker is aware of some number of vacancies. However, only a sub-
set of these constitute genuine opportunities, that is, a vacancy that the worker is suit-
able for, and thus would receive an offer were they to apply. A worker amasses job op-
portunities according to a Poisson rate λs that differs by the employment state s of the
worker. This Poisson rate represents the posting of a vacancy that the worker is both suit-
able for and aware of. For this reason, the Poisson rate may differ by employment state
(consistent with evidence from Faberman et al. (2016)). For example, employed workers
could learn about opportunities in other firms through referral networks at their places
of work. We assume that once a worker has learned of an opportunity it is not forgotten.
The rate at which these opportunities disappear comes instead from the firm ceasing to
hire workers, which happens at Poisson rate υ.
We assume that the worker applies to their stock of opportunities j at a Poisson rate
γs . One interpretation is that a worker incurs a fixed cost in time when applying to jobs.
The process described is similar to one in which free time arrives at a Poisson rate. The
frequency at which workers have available time to look for jobs will likely vary with their
employment state. Our parameter estimates suggest that, relative to the employed, the
unemployed apply far more frequently. We argue that this is also borne out by the data.
Krueger and Mueller (2012) found that in the U.S. while the unemployed engage in active
job search more often than the employed, 20% spend some time in a given day looking
for work compared to 06% of the employed. Conditional on looking, both groups spend
a large and comparable time searching, approximately 160 minutes for the unemployed
and 100 minutes for the employed.
A finite value for the application rate γs implies that workers match with the stock
intermittently. Some workers will have no opportunities and will wait for the flow to
increase their stock of opportunities, which is analogous to a worker waiting to match
with the flow in a standard discrete time stock-flow matching model. When the worker
matches with the stock of vacancies, they choose the most appropriate prospect.
In the model, after an offer has been turned down, be it for an alternative job
prospect or staying with a current employer, a worker cannot subsequently return to
that offer. We think that this captures a realistic feature of the labor market and is analo-
gous to the standard assumption in the job ladder models that previous jobs cannot be
10Consider an environment in which workers are aware of detailed information regarding their prospects
(e.g., the latent number of opportunities in their set and the wages associated with them). If γu > γe, for
those earning a low wage and with good prospects, the value of unemployment to the worker could poten-
tially exceed the value of continued employment. In the estimated model, this affects a negligible number
of workers and would affect no one if unemployment insurance is not paid to voluntary quits or if there is a
sufficiently high minimum wage.
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recalled.11 An alternative modeling choice would be to assume that workers can hold on
to rejected offers until the firm stops looking for workers. This would somewhat compli-
cate the exposition without being quantitatively important as vacancies and, therefore,
prospects have a short shelf life. We calibrate the rate of expiry υ later based on the dura-
tion of a vacancy and find that job opportunities last approximately 1 month. This is an
order of magnitude larger than the rate at which employed workers, for example, switch
jobs and would likely therefore have little effect on our results. In Appendix A.1.1 (see
Supplementary Material, Bradley and Gottfries (2021)), we describe the flow equations
for the distribution of job opportunities, j ∈N+.
Each employment prospect arrives with a wage that is set optimally by profit max-
imizing firms. Firms can post wages conditional on worker type x. In equilibrium, the
wage that a firm of productivity rank F pays a worker of productivity x is denoted by the
wage function w(xF).
2.2 Worker problem
An individual’s utility is given by the present expected discounted value of their future
income stream. It turns out to be convenient to write all value functions in terms of a
worker’s employment status, opportunity stock and, if employed, their wage. We wish
to remain agnostic on exactly what is contained in the information set of the worker
regarding their opportunities. One interpretation, is that a worker is aware of a set of
vacancies but not for which of those they are suitable. They only become aware of the
number of true opportunities and their associated wage offers after they apply to the
stock. Importantly, since the meetings are governed by a Poisson process, the equilib-
rium function is the same even if workers had access to more information. The value
function for an unemployed worker of type x with j offers in hand, is given by (1):














U(x j + 1)−U(x j)) + υj(U(x j − 1)−U(x j)) (1)
where F ∈ [01] is the rank of wages from the job offer sampling distribution.12 The value
function of an unemployed worker, discounted by the rate at which she leaves the mar-
ket, is the sum of the flow value of unemployment bx. The search option of the worker
is given by the rate at which she accesses the market, γu, multiplied by the expected re-
turns to matching with the stock. W (·) is the value of employment and defined in (2).
Notice that when an unemployed worker takes up a job offer, she begins her employ-
ment spell with no opportunities. This is because the worker has rejected all other offers
and we assume there is no recall of offers previously turned down. While in unemploy-
11Recall of previous jobs has recently been explored by Fujita and Moscarini (2017) and Carillo-Tudela
and Smith (2016) in a Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and a sequential auctions model of the labor market,
respectively.
12Notice that this corresponds perfectly with a firm’s rank in the productivity distribution. This is be-
cause, as will be seen, firms pay all workers they employ the same piece rate wage and this is a monotoni-
cally increasing function in a firm’s productivity type.
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ment, the number of employment opportunities of a worker follows a stochastic process
with suitable jobs arriving at a rate λu, and losing a given opportunity at a rate υ.
Given the underlying latent variable, the value function associated with employment
can be written as the sum of the contracted flow wage w, the option value of the j op-
portunities in the worker’s stock, the option value of the stochastic process that governs
the evolution of j and the option value of becoming unemployed, which occurs with
probability δ,











} −W (xw j)))dFj
+ λe
(
W (xw j + 1)−W (xw j)) + υj(W (xw j − 1)−W (xw j))
+ δ(U(x j)−W (xw j)) (2)
As in a standard sequential search model, a worker’s decision is whether to accept or
reject a given offer.13 Once matching with the stock, a worker has potentially more than
one offer to contend with. Since the wage lasts forever and all jobs are otherwise homo-
geneous, a worker will always prefer the highest wage job available to them, be it in the
stock of opportunities or the job they are currently employed in. An unemployed worker
accepts a wage if it yields a higher present value than continuing in unemployment.
Since firms post wages optimally, no firm would post a wage less than this value (as-
suming it is lower than their productivity) and, therefore, we are solving for the infimum
of the wage support, φ(x) =w(x0). This is found by solving the equality
U(x0) =W (xφ(x)0) (3)
Solving the reservation wage is slightly more difficult than usual due to the evolution of
the additional state variable—the number of employment opportunities. Appendix A.2
explains how one can compute the value functions and derives an expression for φ(x).
2.3 Steady-state distribution of match quality
In order to solve for the distribution of wages and outstanding matches, we proceed in







where ps(j) is a probability mass function that gives the probability that a worker in state
s has exactly j employment opportunities. The function Σs(F) evaluates the probability
13One could imagine a more sophisticated set of strategies depending on what the worker is aware of
(e.g., the number of vacancies in the stock, her job tenure or the wages of individual job opportunities). In
such an environment, employed workers would under some conditions optimally quit to unemployment.
However, this is beyond the scope of this paper.
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that when a random worker in state s matches with the stock, she has no vacancy above
the rank F . The function Σs(F) has the steady-state solution




[−λe/δ(F̃ − F)](1 − F̃1 − F
) γe+μ











































The derivation of this function is in Appendix A.1.2. The rate of inflow into unem-
ployment from employment is given by δ+μ. Similarly, the rate of outflow from unem-
ployment is given by γu(1 − pu(0)). In steady-state, the inflow is equal to the outflow






The total unemployment rate contains both the friction at which workers qualify for
jobs and the frequency at which they apply. In a hypothetical case in which, λu → ∞, all
workers have some employment prospects, that is, pu(0) = 0, and then the unemploy-
ment rate will purely be due to workers not sending out enough applications and given
by
ũ = δ+μ
δ+μ+ γu  (5)
Comparing the true unemployment rate with the one in which all workers have em-
ployment opportunities reveals the relative importance of the two frictions for the un-
employment rate. Using the function Σs(F), we can further solve for the distribution of
outstanding matches G(F). Note that the inflow of matches below F is γu
∑∞
j=1 Fjpu(j),
that is, the probability that an unemployed worker matches with an offer less than F .
Similarly, the outflow of matches below F is the exogenous separation δ + μ plus the
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(1 − u)(δ+μ+ γe(1 −Σe(F)))  (7)
The associated density function and its derivative are given in Appendix A.1.3.
2.4 Firm problem
The firm commits to a wage schedule in worker productivity at the time of vacancy cre-
ation. The firm then sets the wage to optimally trade off the increased retention and
hiring with the increased cost associated with a higher wage. The expected profits per
vacancy for a firm with match quality rank F posting a wage w are made up by three
terms: the probability that a worker is hired; the expected duration; and the markup.
Combining these gives the expression for the expected profits at the time of vacancy
creation
Π(xwF) = Pr(hire|xw)E(duration|xw)(y(F)x−w) (8)
Since a firm’s size is proportional to Pr(hire|xw)E(duration|xw), this is equivalent to
Burdett and Mortensen (1998) where the firm maximizes steady state profits.
Hiring. Search is random, a firm posting a vacancy can either meet an employed or
unemployed worker. For the worker to accept the offer, the wage has to be higher than
any other offer the worker holds and, if employed, her current wage. Absent of market
thickness dynamics, that is, the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model, workers match in-
stantaneously, which means that the offer is always the best amongst the new job offers.
The wage is acceptable if it is above the current wage or the reservation wage for the un-
employed. In contrast, without OJS, all contacted workers are unmatched but potentially
receive more than one offer as in Burdett and Judd (1983). Either of these mechanisms
will generate equilibrium wage dispersion. Our model combines both aspects as there is
both search on the job and workers match with the stock. The probability that a worker
is hired conditional on meeting can then be calculated using
Pr(hire|w ≥φ) = Pr(meet an unemployed worker)Pr(unemployed worker accepts|w)
+ Pr(meet an employed worker)Pr(employed worker accepts|w)
The probability that a vacancy meets an unemployed worker, conditional on a meeting,
is the flow rate of meetings with unemployed workers divided by the total flow rate of
all meetings. The flow rate of meetings for unemployed workers comprises the prod-
uct of three terms: the rate at which the worker engages in active search; the stock of
unemployed; and the expected number of opportunities. The expected number of job
opportunities is given by
∑∞
j=1 jps(j).
The probability that the worker accepts the offer, conditional on meeting with the
vacancy, can be broken up into two parts. The probability that the offer is better than her
current offer (1 for the unemployed and G(w) for the employed) times the probability
that the offer is the highest among all offers the worker has received. The probability that
Quantitative Economics 12 (2021) Stochastic employment opportunities 1409
an offer with wage rank F is the highest offer among all offers for the worker in state s
is the probability that the vacancy meets a worker with j offers jps(j)∑∞
j=1 jps(j)
, multiplied by


























































u(1)+ γe(1 − u)Σ′e(1)
) 
Duration of a job. Unlike in Burdett and Mortensen (1998), the duration of a job is
not exponentially distributed. Instead, the quit rate is a time varying object. It turns out
that even though the leaving rate is not constant, the average leaving rate is a sufficient
statistic for the expected duration at the time of hiring due to Little’s law. We can cal-
culate the expected duration at the time of hiring. The average rate at which a worker
working in a firm of productivity rank F leaves the job is given by δ+μ+ γe(1 −Σe(F)).
The average duration in a job F is therefore just 1/(δ+μ+ γe(1 −Σe(F))).
2.5 Equilibrium
An equilibrium in this economy is characterized by: the value functions {U(x j)
W (xw j)Π(xwF)} given by (1), (2), and (8), respectively; a wage function w(xF)
that maximizes the present value of profits (8); and a reservation wage φ(x) solving
equation (3). In this environment, a firm’s optimal strategy will be to post piece rate
contracts in worker type, as in Barlevy (2008), since all flow income scales with work-
ers’ productivity x. With a slight abuse of notation, we can express the wage function
as w(xF) = xw(F) and the value functions as U(x j) = xU(j) and W (xw(xF) j) =
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xW (w(F) j). The piece rate wage w(F) solves the firm problem, such that (8) is maxi-
mized, and the worker is indifferent between the lowest wage and unemployment, both
absent of opportunities W (xφ(x)0) =U(x0) with φ(x) = xw(0).
2.6 Identification
In this subsection, we discuss the identification the transition parameters {μδλuλe
γuγe}. Intuitively, the rate of application γu and γe determines the job finding rate in
unemployment and the job-to-job transition rate, respectively. The values of λu and λe
instead determine how the job finding rate changes with duration in unemployment
and employment, respectively. Appendix A.3 provides a proof that these transition pa-
rameters of our model are identified relying only on transition moments (thus, justify-
ing the use of a two-step procedure). Although the exact moments discussed in the Ap-
pendix A.3 are not practically implemented in the estimation, we use similar moments
for the purpose of estimation. The aim of our estimation is to minimize a criterion de-
fined as a distance between simulated and empirically observable moments. Identifica-
tion of worker and firm productivity is discussed in Section 3.3 and relies on the specific
parametric assumptions.
2.7 Discussion
Relation to existing models. Notice that a number of commonly used search models are
nested in our framework. First, in the absence of dynamic market thickness, that is, as
γs → ∞ ∀s ∈ {eu}. The model converges to the standard job ladder model of Burdett and
Mortensen (1998). In the limit, as workers continuously apply, a worker has to immedi-
ately decide whether to accept or reject a given offer, and hence, there are never mul-
tiple offers to contemplate simultaneously. Second, with no on-the-job search, γe = 0,
and with applications made continuously by the unemployed, γu → ∞, the model nests
a version of the stock-flow matching function in continuous time; see Coles and Smith
(1998). In this case, after separating from a firm, the worker will immediately match with
the stock of their available opportunities. If the stock is nonempty, the worker will di-
rectly transition to a new job, whereas if the stock is empty, the worker has to wait for
the inflow of new opportunities. Lastly, if γe = 0, and the unemployed infrequently ap-
ply for jobs, γu ∈ (0∞), then the model shares the feature of stock-flow matching but
with search frictions. This case corresponds closely to a dynamic version of the Burdett
and Judd (1983) model. We estimate the baseline model as well as the model without
dynamics of market thickness (NDT), and without on-the-job search (NOJS).
Discussion of wages. In Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and Bontemps, Robin, and
den Berg (2000), like in our model, the firm trades off the hiring and retention of workers
against a higher wage cost. The first-order condition for the logarithm of expected profits
gives a differential equation for the optimal wage. Defining h(F) = ∂ log Pr(hire)/∂F and
r(F) = ∂ logE(duration)/∂F and wm(F) = ∫ F0 m(F)(y(F) − w(F))dF where, m ∈ {h r},
we can decompose the wage w(F) into three terms, the wage increase from the reten-
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tion motive (wr(F)) and the hiring motive (wh(F)) and the wage that satisfies the partic-
ipation constraint for the worker w(0),
w(F) =wr(F)+wh(F)+w(0)
In the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model, the motive to pay for retention and hiring
is
r(F) = h(F) = λe
δ+μ+ λe(1 − F)


















In Appendix A.6, Figure A.3, we show the fraction of the wage that is paid due to the
incentive to retention workers. The results suggest that the hiring motive is quantita-
tively more important, but relatively less so higher up in the upper support of the wage
distribution.
We can now compare how the firm’s incentive to increase wages depends on the es-
timated parameters. The percentage increase in the firm size with firm type, ′(F)/(F),






y(F)−w(F)) −w′(F) = 0 (9)
We refer to G′′(F)/G′(F) as the degree of competition. If G′′(F)/G′(F) is low, then the
firm size is unresponsive to the wage rank and there is thus little reason to increase the



























δ+μ+ λe(1 − F)
Note that Σs(F) is a convex function. When the firm considers the hiring margin in
the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model, it need only consider the probability that the
worker is working at a lower paying firm. In our setup, the firm also needs to consider
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the probability that the worker has a better offer in hand. The competition in our model
therefore increases more as we move to the tail of the distribution.
The Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model fails to generate much wage competition
in the upper tail of the distribution. Our model includes a further competition term via
a Burdett and Judd (1983) mechanism. In order to show the difference, we plot expres-
sion (9) to calculate the competition for different firm types for Burdett and Mortensen
(1998) and our model. Figure A.2, in the Appendix A.5, reveals, that for all skill groups,
high productive firms exhibit a stronger wage competition in our model as compared
to Burdett and Mortensen (1998). The intuition for this is that since some workers have
many offers, it is relatively more likely that the highest offer is in the upper part of the
distribution. The competition at the lower type firm is, on the other hand, similar in our
model and that in the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model. The introduction of thin
markets into the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model thus shifts competition from the
lower to the upper part of the distribution, thereby increasing the dispersion of wages
for a given primitive firm productivity distribution.
Alternative wage setting mechanisms. There are numerous alternative approaches to
wage setting in models with on-the-job search. The contribution of our paper is in the
modeling of the frictions governing worker reallocation which could, in principle, be
incorporated with any wage setting protocol. We therefore opt for a simple wage setting
mechanism, which is common in the literature whilst also doing justice to the data. It
should also be noted that the nature of wage setting is hard to identify in a short panel
without relying on strong functional form assumptions.
We follow Burdett and Mortensen (1998), an environment in which firms post and
commit to wages prior to meeting the worker and subsequently do not match outside of-
fers. This approach is taken for a number of practical reasons. First, it is used frequently
in the literature. Second, many other wage setting mechanisms will result in only minor
differences in the estimated parameters. In fact, if the wage setting results in efficient
transitions,14 only the parameters of the production functions and value of home pro-
duction will differ depending on the determination of wages.15 Third, the equilibrium
with this wage setting is robust to timing assumptions and the exact specification of the
information set of workers and firms which is not necessarily true for some of the other
commonly used alternatives in the literature.16
14That is a worker, in equilibrium, accepts a job offer if and only if the productive is higher than that of
their current employer.
15Optimal back-loaded wage contracts in the spirit of Burdett and Coles (2003) and Stevens (2004) are
notable examples of a wage setting protocol in which efficient transitions does not (necessarily) hold; see
Burdett and Coles (2010).
16Consider a protocol in which outside offers are matched, as in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002). If of-
fers arrive sequentially, the value associated with unemployment is the discounted flow benefit of unem-
ployment. However, if job offers arrive simultaneously, firms would compete with each other resulting in a
higher value associated with unemployment. Similarly, if wages are renegotiated infrequently without offer
matching as in Gottfries (2019). The incentive to pay a higher wage to retain the worker would depend on
the number of prospects j, and thereby on the exact information set of the worker.
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3. Estimation
Our estimation will focus on estimating the model presented in the previous sections. In
addition, we estimate the special cases of no dynamics of market thickness (NDT) and
without OJS (NOJS).
3.1 Data
The data used in estimation are taken from the Current Population Survey (CPS) and the
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). Moments relating to labor mobil-
ity are taken from the CPS, due to its larger cross-sectional component. Wage moments
are taken from the SIPP. The sample is stratified according to observable skill level into
three distinct strata, consistent across data source. They are: the college educated; those
whose highest academic achievement is a high school diploma; and those who have not
completed their high school education.17 We restrict attention to male workers aged be-
tween 25 and 45 in order to best mitigate issues associated with early retirement and
nonparticipation. In order to give the alternative specifications ample chance of match-
ing the level of frictional wage dispersion, we trim the bottom 10% of the wage distri-
bution.18 Moreover, we restrict the attention to the relatively short and stable period
between the years 1996 and 1999, inclusive. As will be seen, key parameters will be iden-
tified from labor mobility by duration and we do not want cohort effects to play any
role. In Supplementary Appendix S.2, we plot the separation and job finding rates by
age. Separation rates exhibit a clear downward trend and the pattern of the finding rate
is less clear. Since our model assumes a constant separation rate, we choose a window
where this seems to be a fair approximation of the data. Specific details regarding sample
selection are provided in the Supplementary Appendix.
The identification relies on employment dynamics and the cross-sectional wage dis-
tribution. Table 1 reports moments on hourly earnings and the number of hours worked
per week for each stratum. These are computed by dividing the self-reported weekly
earnings by self-reported hours worked per week. Since in the estimation, wage data
are taken from the SIPP and employment dynamics from the CPS, it is reassuring that
the data in both look quantitatively similar. The two data sets are broadly consistent.
Respondents in the SIPP are, on average higher skilled and work a greater number of
hours. There are large systematic differences in hourly earnings across skills. These dif-
ferences are the motivation for stratification. Comparing hourly earnings across strata
seems sensible as there is little cross strata variation in hours. Finally, it is worth bearing
in mind that the medium-skilled, those with a high school diploma but without a college
degree, account for about half of the labor force.
Table 2 presents employment dynamics, estimated from a three-state Markov pro-
cess. All moments presented in Table 2 will be matched in the estimation to come. In
17The particularities of the stratification are detailed in the Supplementary Appendix (Bradley and Got-
tfries (2021)).
18We do this so not to overstate the mean-min ratio as survey data are susceptible to measurement error
(see Bound, Brown, and Mathiowetz (2001)) particularly at the extremum of the wage distribution.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics.
All Low Skill Medium Skill High Skill
Proportions:
CPS 100% 11% 52% 37%
SIPP 100% 9% 51% 40%
Mean Earnings ($/hour):
CPS 158 98 139 202
SIPP 157 96 134 199
Mean Weekly Hours Worked:
CPS 431 414 425 442
SIPP 449 435 444 459
Note: Data come from the Monthly Outgoing Rotation Group (MORG) of the CPS and the on-seam months of the SIPP,
months that do not rely on recall. Moments are based on male workers aged between 25 and 45 between 1996 and 1999, inclu-
sive. The CPS data contains 163,093 observations and the SIPP 85,972. All moments presented here and elsewhere are computed
using the appropriate sampling weights.
Table 2. Transition rates of the employed.
All Low Skill Medium Skill High Skill
probability in t + 1 employed worker is:
Inactive 0010 0020 0010 0006
Unemployed 0012 0026 0013 0006
Employed by different employer 0026 0033 0026 0023
Number employed in sample 584,920 58,415 304,319 222,186
Note: The transition rates are monthly. Data are taken from the CPS and relate to 25–45-year-old males between 1996 and
1999, inclusive.
addition, the job finding rate of the unemployed is targeted by duration of the unem-
ployment spell. The largest differences in employment dynamics across strata are the
frequency to which workers exit employment, rather than the frequency to which they
are hired from unemployment; see Figure 1. The higher the skill of a worker, the longer
the expected employment duration with lower exit probabilities to inactivity, unemploy-
ment, or an alternative employer.
3.2 Parameterization
The set of parameters to be estimated is given by the vector θ,
θ = (μδυλuλeγuγebΓx(x)Γy(y))′ (10)
We assume the labor market is segmented by observable skill, as well as gender and
the age cutoff described in Section 3.1. The vector θ is estimated for each skill and the
economy at large. Notice that (10) contains the entire distributions of Γx(x) and Γy(y).
We make further parametric assumptions on the primitive initial distribution of worker
and firm types. We assume that the distributions follow transformed log-normals. With
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a slight abuse of notation, we define a worker’s rank in the distribution as Fx and recall
that a firm’s rank is F .  denotes a standard normal distribution. For firm’s we include













The rate at which workers lose employment opportunities, υ, is the only parameter
not directly estimated and calibrated to match the mean duration of a vacancy. Vacancy
duration is estimated using the “Conference Board Help Wanted Online Data Series”
(HWOL) using a simple relation between the stock and the flow. Details of exactly how
this parameter is calibrated are provided in Appendix A.4. It should be noted that these
data do not cover our estimation window nor can we look at the vacancy duration by
skill requirement of the job opening. The implied value of the mean duration (1/υ) is
approximately 1 month.19
After these assumptions, equation (10) can be reduced to the following vector of
scalars. The focus of the rest of this section is the estimation of the vector θ,
θ = (μδλuλeγuγebσxμyσy)′
3.3 Estimation protocol
The model is estimated by indirect inference in two steps. In a first step, employment
transitions are matched, based on CPS data. The second step matches auxiliary wage
moments computed from the SIPP to uncover the underlying primitive productivity dis-
tributions of workers and firms and the value of home production. To estimate the mod-
els of no OJS search and no dynamic market thickness, we use an identical first step. In
order to match the same degree of frictional wage dispersion, we compute the distribu-
tion predicted by our baseline model and target this directly. To do this, we use a more
flexible distribution to guarantee a satisfactory fit.20 Thus, for the two alternative speci-
fications, we do not estimate the distribution of worker types.
Transition rates. The first step matches aggregate job-to-job, employment to unem-
ployment, and the rate at which workers leave the labor market. Finally, the job find-
ing rate of the unemployed are computed by duration. The job finding rate of the un-
employed is computed as a monthly probability at a weekly frequency for the first 12
weeks of their unemployment spell. To avoid sparsity, we then compute the monthly
probability at a monthly frequency for the following 9 months. This allows us to target
precisely the steep initial decline in the hazard rate and avoids time windows later in
the spell where no transitions are observed. We thus match 24 moments, three aggre-
gate rates, and 21 job finding rates by duration of unemployment spell, which we weight
19Notice, we assume the duration of a vacancy is orthogonal to a worker’s skill. With more detailed mi-
crodata regarding the skill requirements of a job, theoretically this parameter could also be conditioned on
worker skill. However, as we argue in Appendix S.4, quantitative results do not appear to depend on the
specific calibration of υ.
20We include an additional scale parameter such that y(F) = exp(μy)+ ζy exp[σy−1(F)]. Notice that for
ζy = 1 it becomes identical to the distribution of firm types in the baseline.
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by the precision to which they are estimated in the data. This step is matched varying
θt = (μδλuλeγuγe) and can be done independently of all other parameters. For-
mally, θt is the solution to the following:






) −mt)′V̂ −1(mt(θt) −mt)
where mt(θt) and mt are the 25 targeted moments, from the model and data, respec-
tively, and V̂ is the diagonal of the variance-covariance matrix of mt . It is worth point-
ing out that the estimation attributes all duration dependence in the data through our
model’s specific channel. There are of course likely many other sources that we could
potentially account for. We have ignored mechanisms in order to make the results eas-
ier to interpret. The other extreme case of no duration dependence corresponds to the
restriction imposed under the model of no dynamic thickness.
Wage distributions. This step estimates the value of home production and worker
and firm productivity parameters, θp := (bσxμyσy). We simulate data generated from
our model as in the SIPP. That is, we simulate a monthly panel with the same number
of individuals, over the same time frame, with the same rate of attrition. Since we only
rely on the seam of the SIPP, where wages are not based on recall, we treat the simu-
lated data in the same way. In order to distinguish between the relative contribution of
worker and firm productivity, we match each (1st to 99th) percentile of the mean wage
of a worker over our time horizon. Further, we match the same percentiles of the overall
wage distribution including the infimum of the support. This leaves a total of 199 empir-
ical moments to fit, which we denote by the vector mp. To review this, mp consists of the
100 quantiles of the wage support {wq}q=099 and the 99 quantiles of the mean worker
wage {wq}q=199.
Unlike step one, we do not have any analytical expressions for our moments, but
instead rely on Monte Carlo simulations. We simulate the model M times and take the






since the empirical distribution of wages contains excess mass at round numbers and
there is simulation error, a bootstrapped weighting matrix does not seem appropriate.
Instead, we implement a two-step GMM estimation in which the first step estimates the
weighting matrix, W (θ)−1. In the first step, take an initial guess at W (θ)−1 as the iden-
tity matrix and estimate the model. We then simulate mpi (θ
p) 500 times and compute
a variance-covariance matrix as our estimate of W (θ). The second step estimates θp as
the solution to






























Practicalities. In the second step of the estimation, we resimulate our model 500
times, M = 500. In order to isolate differences across specifications, we first estimate
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our model. Then, in the two special cases, we fix the distribution of worker productiv-
ity to be identical to our model. In this estimation of the two special cases (no market
thickness and no OJS), we include an additional scale parameter of the firm productivity
distribution ζy to ensure a satisfactory fit. In all three specifications the first step is iden-
tical, but for the two nested cases, the second step matches the distribution of wages
simulated from our baseline model. That is, target 99 percentiles of the G(w) distribu-
tion predicted by the baseline model as above, using the identity matrix as a weighting
matrix.
Identification. As with targeting the transition rates, this step is overidentified. Un-
like the first step, however, identification relies on heuristic argument. Changing any of
the five elements of the vector θp will change all 199 targeted moments. However, certain
parameters speak directly to certain moments in the data. The level of wages is driven
primarily by the level of firm productivity, in particular the location parameter μy . The
dispersion of a worker’s mean wage by the dispersion in worker type σy . Consider the
case of workers being homogeneous in productivity. Given a sufficiently long time hori-
zon, in which workers are observed in many different jobs, one would expect to see little
or no dispersion in worker’s mean wage. Since all wage heterogeneity is governed by the
firm in which they are matched and not any systematic differences across workers. The
dispersion of firm types explains any residual dispersion in the overall wage distribu-
tion: the so-called level of frictional wage dispersion. Finally, given all other elements in
θp, the value of home production b pins down the lowest observed wage.
3.4 Results
Running the multistep estimation procedure as described yields the parameter esti-
mates presented in Table 3. The first rows presents the transition parameters followed
by the replacement ratio. The final cell of Table 3 presents the parameters from the un-
derlying distributions of worker and firm productivity. Bootstrapped standard errors are
given in parentheses and all parameters are statistically significant to any conventional
significance level.
Fit. Figure 1 shows the probability that an unemployed worker moves to employ-
ment, by the duration of her unemployment spell. The horizontal dotted line represents
that predicted with dynamic thickness (NDT). The declining solid line is our baseline
model and the crosses and dashed line are the targeted moments from the data. We
omit the special case of no OJS as it is indistinguishable from the baseline. All models do
almost exactly match the aggregate transition rates. Appendix S.3 displays the fit of the
wage distributions. Figure S.2 shows the fit of the overall wage distribution for the base-
line model. Figure S.3 displays the fit of the distribution of mean worker wages. Both
distributions are skewed to the right for all worker types.
Transition parameters. Inspecting the transition parameters, the upper cell of Ta-
ble 3, it is immediately apparent that each model has a very different interpretation of
the functioning of the labor market. First, across all skill groups, in the model without
market thickness (NDT) λu > λe, which implies that workers are exposed to a greater
number of job offers in unemployment than in employment. The higher rate at which
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Figure 1. Job finding rate by duration of unemployment. Note: The empirical monthly job
finding rate, represented by an ‘x’, is computed at a weekly frequency for the first 12 weeks
and a monthly frequency thereafter. The dashed black line represents the fitted relationship
β1 + β2 exp(−β3τ), where τ is unemployment duration (in weeks) and the βs are estimated by
nonlinear least squares according to the same criterion as is used in the estimation.
the unemployed find new jobs is rationalized by a higher contact rate in NDT. Finally,
across all skill groups, the job destruction rate δ is higher in the model with stochastic
market thickness. In that version, the newly unemployed find jobs more quickly than
they would in the NDT framework and, consequently, more workers lose their jobs and
find employment within a month.21
Duration dependence decomposition. The duration dependence can be decomposed
into two parts. First, there is a dynamic selection whereby those with more prospects
are more likely to leave unemployment. Second, a worker’s set of opportunities evolve
21By the same logic, the baseline model also generates declining E → U monthly transitions with the
duration of employment. The number of opportunities is on average increasing with the duration of an
employment spell, which increases the probability of returning to employment within the month.
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Figure 2. Duration dependence decomposition. Note: The black solid line represents the
monthly job finding rate predicted by the model by unemployment duration. The dashed lines
are intended to compute the duration dependence absent of dynamic selection. This is done by
computing the job finding rate assuming the pool of unemployment is fixed—workers remaining
in unemployment after finding a job.
stochastically over their unemployment spell. The latter can be isolated by computing
the job finding rate for workers assuming that those that find a job stay in the pool of
unemployed.22 The exercise is inspired by the procedure of Alvarez, Borovickova, and
Shimer (2019) who decompose duration in a stopping time model. Figure 2 performs
this exercise fixing the population of unemployed after 0, 4 and 8 weeks of unemploy-
ment. As discussed, the job finding rate converges to an ergodic rate. Ignoring dynamic
selection, by fixing the pool of unemployment, the true duration dependence converges
to a higher level.
The selection effect always acts to decrease the job finding rate—as only those with
positive opportunities leave the pool of unemployment. However, the true duration de-
22We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
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Table 4. Unemployment decomposition.
Unemployment Rate All High Skill Medium Skill Low Skill
ũ 20% 14% 23% 31%
u 44% 26% 49% 85%
Note: This table computes and compares u and ũ as defined in equations (4) and (5).
pendence depends on the distribution of opportunities. Workers who have been un-
employed for shorter lengths of time have on average more opportunities but are on
average losing them as time lapses. We therefore see a monotonic decline in the hazard
rate when we fix the pool for shorter periods. However, after longer periods, workers are
on average accumulating opportunities which explains why when the population of the
unemployed is fixed after 8 weeks we see an increase in the job finding rate. In fact, for
long a duration the two channels perfectly offset, which explains why the job finding
rate converges to a constant level. We interpret share of the decline of the job finding
rate, which is captured when the population is held fixed as the relative importance of
true duration dependence. Using this metric and the entire sample, true duration de-
pendence explains approximately 70% of the fall in the job finding rate. We attribute the
final 30% to dynamic selection.
Unemployment decomposition. In Burdett and Mortensen (1998), there is only one
source of unemployment due to the infrequent arrival of job offers. However, in our
model, there are two sources of labor market frictions. Not only must a worker apply
for jobs, she must also have positive employment prospects. Equation (4) denotes the
true unemployment rate u and equation (5) an unemployment rate in which the only
impediment to finding work is the frequency in which one applies to jobs, ũ. A compar-
ison of the two rates reveals the relative quantitative importance of the two sources of
frictions.
The exit rate from unemployment occurs after a γu shock and on top of this,
the worker must also have at least one potential job, which occurs with probability
(1 − Σ0(0)). The frictional rate is governed by only the primitive γu which prevents a
worker from matching with her current opportunities. The relative importance of the
two frictions, by skill group, is reported in Table 4. The quantitative importance of a lack
of opportunity is apparent, with this mechanism being responsible for approximately
half of the unemployment rate.
3.5 Frictional wage dispersion
As has been discussed, in order to generate the level of frictional wage dispersion ob-
served in the data, a typical search model requires an implausibly low or even nega-
tive flow benefit associated with unemployment. Our results, see Table 3, show that the
implied replacement ratio, the ratio of the flow benefit to the mean wage in the econ-
omy needed to justify the observed wage distribution, is much higher under the baseline
model. Across all skill groups, only the baseline model predicts a positive replacement
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ratio and depending on the skill, the other two specifications require large costs associ-
ated with unemployment. To put our numbers in some context, they are consistent with
the macro labor literature (e.g., Shimer (2005) and Elsby and Michaels (2013)) as well
as estimates from a field experiment which put the replacement ratio at 58% (Mas and
Pallais (2019)).
The replacement ratio in the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model can be decom-
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The terms are intuitive; there are differences in the flow value and in the search option,
captured by how often search occurs, the sampling distribution of wages and finally be-
cause, in our model, workers who separate from a job are in a different position as com-
pared to the average unemployed. The second term, γi(1 − Σi(F̃)), differs because the
unemployed and employed do, on average, sample from different distributions, Σi(F̃),
and at different rates, γi. Faberman et al. (2016) provided evidence that the employed
on average sample from a better distribution. Similarly, the third term, Σuu(F̃)−Σu(F̃),
captures the effect that workers moving from employment to unemployment do, on av-
erage, have a higher number of prospects than the average unemployed, which gener-
ates the declining job finding rate with the duration of unemployment observed in the
data. These effects are missed in the standard job ladder model. Table 5 provides a thor-
ough decomposition of the replacement ratios for the different specifications and skill
groups. A consistent finding across all skill groups is that only the baseline specification
can accommodate the degree of frictional wage dispersion with a positive replacement
ratio. An inspection of Table 5 reveals that while the insurance option helps, it is the
reduction in the search option, which is quantitatively more important. While still nega-
tive, the better average prospects that the employed are exposed to significantly reduce
the value of waiting in unemployment and, consequently, unemployed workers for the
same value of b are prepared to accept much lower wages.
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NDT −536% 585% −1121% 0% −444% 492% −936% 0%
NOJS −2902% 544% −3662% 215% −7141% 462% −7811% 208%
Baseline 350% 595% −294% 49% 462% 527% −86% 22%
Medium Skill Low Skill
NDT −358% 634% −992% 0% −177% 614% −791% 0%
NOJS −2000% 605% −2793% 189% −464% 623% −1288% 201%
Baseline 441% 644% −250% 47% 431% 620% −280% 91%
Note: This table provides results from decomposing the replacement ratio into its three constituent parts derived in equa-
tions (11) and (12).
3.6 Earnings loss
Our baseline model and the two alternative specifications provide very different predic-
tions regarding the average wage an unemployed worker receives in employment as a
function of the duration of her unemployment spell. As is displayed in Figure 3, with no
dynamic market thickness, an unemployed worker samples from the same distribution
of wages, independent of the duration of their unemployment spell to date. However,
because of selection into better jobs, the job ladder, this wage is lower than the mean
wage among employed workers. Without OJS, there is no selection into better jobs for
the employed. Thus, the average wage taken by an unemployed worker equals the av-
erage wage amongst employed workers. However, as a result of dynamic selection, a
worker with a longer duration of unemployment will, on average, have fewer prospects,
and thus samples from a distribution with a lower mean wage. This results in a decline
in the average starting wage within the first couple of months. Our baseline model has
both of these features, and thus generates both an average earnings loss, via selection
in employment, and increasing losses with the duration of unemployment via dynamic
selection.
Qualitatively, these two features: lower mean wages of new hires and declining wages
with the duration of an unemployment spell mirror the data; see, for example, Addison
and Portugal (1989). To assess whether our model matches the process quantitatively
would require a thorough empirical examination beyond the scope of this paper. In par-
ticular, there is a large literature showing dispersion in earnings losses which vary with
labor market features that are not specifically modeled in this paper.23
3.7 Search process
To demonstrate that our model replicates workers’ search behavior in a realistic man-
ner, we compare the underlying theoretical mechanism with direct evidence on work-
23Empirical studies have shown earnings losses vary by: industry/occupation Stevens (1997); local labor
market conditions Carrington (1993); and Couch and Placzek (2010).
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Figure 3. Wage loss after job loss. Note: The figure shows the mean wage an unemployed agent
receives by the duration of their unemployment spell. This wage is reported relative to the mean
wage in the labor market as a whole.
ers’ search behavior. For this exercise, we rely on two data sources not used in our es-
timation. They constitute a supplement to the Survey of Consumer Expectations (SCE)
provided by the New York Fed from 2013 and 2014 and has recently also been used by
Faberman et al. (2016). The survey is a repeated cross-section, nationally representative
and has approximately 1200 individuals per year. In addition, we use the Survey of Un-
employed Workers in New Jersey. The data and their construction are detailed in Krueger
and Mueller (2011). 6025 unemployed workers in the New Jersey area are surveyed at a
weekly frequency for up to 24 weeks. A feature of the data is that it asks workers about
the job offers they receive (not necessarily take) and their contemporaneous reservation
wage.24 Results from both data sets are weighted by the weights provided and described
in Faberman et al. (2016) and Krueger and Mueller (2016), respectively.
24The data for this analysis are available for public download at http://opr.princeton.edu/archive/njui/.
Quantitative Economics 12 (2021) Stochastic employment opportunities 1425
Figure 4. Number of job offers. Note: The data come from the survey of unemployed job seek-
ers in New Jersey. We restrict our attention to male workers between the age of 25 and 45. Panel
(a) shows the distribution of reported job offers received in a week, conditional on receiving at
least one offer: as observed empirically (weighted by sampling weights); implied by a Poisson
process, and as implied by the baseline model. Our interpretation of offers in the model is the
distribution of opportunities held by the unemployed, pu(j). Panel (b) is the log ratio of the im-
plied distributions with the data.
First, we exploit data from the Survey of Unemployed Workers in New Jersey. In Fig-
ure 4, we present the number of offers received by unemployed workers in a month and
compare this to what is predicted by our model and a memoryless Poisson process. The
memoryless Poisson process is computed, given the proportion of people in the data
with no offers. Our baseline model is a representation of the distribution pu(j), the so-
lution of the flow equations (15) and (16). Since the data cover a different time period
and only focus on New Jersey, there is no reason to assume that the model will fit the
data well. However, what is clear from panel (b) is that a memoryless Poisson process
cannot generate the number of people with large numbers of offers that is observed in
the data—a feature that our baseline model replicates.
Turning to the supplement of the Survey of Consumer Expectations (SCE), it is worth
noting that the statistics presented here are merely to demonstrate that the underlying
search process reported in the survey is quite different from what is assumed in a stan-
dard search model and bears some resemblance to the mechanism in our model. Any
further inference is difficult to make since although representative, the sample has a
fairly small cross-section, meaning that inference about the unemployed is based on
61 (26) individuals (males). Table 6 shows by employment status, over a 4-week period,
the mean number of applications, the proportion of those making at least one appli-
cation, and the mean number of contacts received. We present these from the model
and the data, and we further distinguish between the unemployed and long-term un-
employed in our model. The unemployed do, on average, send out more applications
and more frequently engage in active search as compared to their employed counter-
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Table 6. Mean job prospects by employment status.
# of Applications Prop. who Apply # of Contacts













L.T. Unemployed 008 — 031 — 054 —
Note: The data are taken from the Survey of Consumer Expectations and the attention is restricted to male workers. Appli-
cations are calculated based on the question “How many potential employers, if any, did you apply to for employment within the
LAST 4 WEEKS? Please include all applications made in person, online, or through other direct methods. Do not include inquiries
that did not lead to a job application.” Similarly, the number of contacts are computed based on the question “In the LAST 4
WEEKS, how many potential employers contacted you about a job opening? Please include all contacts, even those that were not
solicited by you.” All moments are computed based on appropriate sampling weights. Long-term unemployed is defined as
having reached the ergodic distribution of prospects, in practice this occurs in under 3 months. In the model, the proportion
who apply is computed as the proportion who actively apply and have positive prospects. The number of contacts are the total
number of prospects applied to. Reported in the parentheses are standard errors.
parts. A fact that our model successfully reconciles.25 The number of contacts received
in a month, on the other hand, is similar across the two groups. However, since we have
relatively few unemployed in the sample, it is hard to establish this clearly. What is cer-
tain is that, as implied by a standard job ladder model, the unemployed do not receive an
order of magnitude larger contacts than their employed counterparts. Finally, we have
included the model’s predictions for the long-term unemployed to further inform the
reader. However, with so few unemployed in the data, the same moments in the data are
uninformative.
4. Conclusion
This paper sets up a model, which extends the standard job ladder model to incorporate
thin markets. The model is solved analytically and estimated on U.S. survey data. The
estimated model delivers declining job finding rates by the duration of unemployment
as observed in the data. Further, the flow value associated with unemployment required
to match the wage distribution does not need to be large and negative. Our estimates of
the replacement ratio, in the order of a quarter to a half of the workers’ average wage, are
consistent with the numbers used in the macro labor literature. On the other hand, the
estimation of the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model and a model without on-the-job
search requires large and negative replacement ratios. Additionally, to generate a wage
penalty associated with the duration of an unemployment spell, the standard job ladder
model requires decreasing general human capital in unemployment. Our model gener-
ates this via the stochastic process for employment prospects. This has implications for
the persistence in earnings losses following job displacement. Whether this mechanism
can generate a sufficient persistence in earnings remains an open question and could
prove fruitful for future research.
25The number of applications sent out in the data is significantly higher than what is predicted by the
model. This difference could be driven by differences in applications and our model definition of a suitable
opportunity. The data is also sensitive to a few people are observed sending out hundreds of applications.
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